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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of foreign ownership
on productivity under reasonable identi…cation assumptions. In particular we
estimate dynamic Cobb-Douglas production functions augmented with a set
of variables capturing complementary characteristics of foreign ownership. We
apply the GMM-System estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) to
a large sample of …rms located in Italy. Our aggregate …ndings suggest that
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement
errors, foreign ownership has no e¤ect on productivity. Therefore we do not
…nd widespread empirical support to the standard internalization theory of
foreign direct investment. However, we also …nd that nationality matters
since …rms under US ownership tend to be more productive than …rms under
national ownership. In turn this additional result suggests that the transfer of
knowledge implied by the internalization theory occurs only if the di¤erence
between the recipient and the investment country is su¢ciently pronounced.
¤We wish to thank Davide Castellani, Steve Davies, Karolina Ekholm, Georges Siotis and
the participants at the CEPR/LdA Workshop on ”Labour Market E¤ects of European For-
eign Investments” for helpful comments on a previous draft. Send correspondence to alessan-
dro.sembenelli@unito.it or l.benfratello@ceris.to.cnr.it
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The existence of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) and the characteristics of their
foreign a¢liates have been extensively examined by the economic literature. The
most widely accepted theory on MNEs, the so-called ”internalization theory” (see
Caves, 1996), provides some insights to both issues. In fact, it suggests that MNEs
exist as they can exploit in foreign markets superior knowledge (managerial ex-
pertise, superior technological skills, etc.) which compensates for the higher costs
induced by operating in a foreign environment. In turn, MNEs’ foreign a¢liates will
bene…t from the transfer of this knowledge and might therefore display higher pro-
ductivity and pro…tability levels with respect to domestic-owned …rms. The alleged
superior performance of MNEs’ subsidiaries compared with domestic-owned …rms
has been widely documented in early empirical works, mostly using cross sectional
data, and has become a ”stylised fact” in the literature on MNEs (Conyon et al.,
2002).
It is however unclear whether this ”stylised fact” can be interpreted as a causal
or structural relationship between being owned by a MNE and being more produc-
tive or pro…table. In fact, simple cross section evidence can be criticised on the
ground of composition e¤ects, …rms’ heterogeneity and estimation issues. Firstly,
MNEs tend to concentrate in high R&D and advertising spending sectors so that
they might be more productive simply because they operate in higher productivity
sectors. Secondly, …rms are heterogeneous (in terms of age, size, capital inten-
sity, input and managerial quality, and the like) and these characteristics might
a¤ect …rms’ productivity. In so far as …rms’ characteristics are observable, they
can be used as control variables to assess the e¤ect of foreign ownership on pro-
ductivity. However, if some of the characteristics are unobservable (e.g. managerial
quality) then non-trivial estimation issues arise. In particular, if unobservables are
correlated with regressors, then simple ordinary least squares are biased and incon-
2sistent. Thirdly, estimation problems might also arise because of simultaneity and
measurement errors which are both very likely to occur in the context of production
function.
This paper contributes to the recent literature on MNEs’ a¢liates performance
by applying appropriate micro econometric techniques to a specially constructed
panel of …rms located in Italy and sampled in the 1992-99 period. In particular,
we estimate dynamic gross output production functions by using the GMM-system
technique recently developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). In doing so, we are able
to recover consistent estimates of the impact of foreign ownership on productivity,
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and measurement error.
Our aggregate …ndings suggest that once potential endogeneity problems are
controlled for, any systematic di¤erence between foreign a¢liates and domestic
…rms disappears. This result contrasts with the view that, everything else equal,
foreign ownership induces higher productivity levels. However, we also …nd that the
country of origin matters as …rms under US ownership outperform domestic-owned
…rms. This …nding gives empirical support to the hypothesis that the transfer of
knowledge occurs only if the gap between host (Italy) and home (US) countries is
su¢ciently pronounced.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section motivates this paper by reviewing
the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on MNEs’ productivity di¤er-
entials with respect to domestic …rms. Section 3 presents our empirical model while
Section 4 describes our sample and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5
comments upon the results whereas Section 6 concludes. An appendix describing
the sample used in this paper is also included.
32P r e v i o u s L i t e r a t u r e
The internalisation - or transaction cost - theory of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
explains the existence of MNEs in terms of some, possibly intangible, assets owned
by these …rms which compensate them for the higher costs implied by operating
abroad (Caves, 1996). In fact, in order to compete in foreign markets, where lo-
cal …rms have better knowledge of local markets, consumer preferences and busi-
ness practices, MNEs must enjoy some other speci…c advantages, such as superior
managerial expertise or technological capabilities. These assets (so-called ”propri-
etary assets”) are mostly intangible and are more likely to be transferred e¢ciently
through internalisation and expansion abroad than through markets mechanisms.
In turn, the internalisation theory suggests that MNEs’ foreign subsidiaries will
bene…t from the transfer of proprietary assets and therefore might display higher
productivity or pro…tability levels compared to local …rms.
The empirical literature has tried to shed light on this issue. Early empirical
work, mostly based on cross section data, has reached the consensus that foreign
a¢liates have higher productivity levels (measured as gross output or value added
per employee) and pay higher wages than domestic …rms. As pointed out by Caves
(1996, pp. 185-6), this is hardly surprising since ”companies do not become multi-
nationals unless they are(were) good at something”. He also points out that the
crucial question to be answered is therefore whether productivity advantages ”are
endogenous to the market-structure environments in which they emerge” or whether
they have a ”pure residual component”.
On the one hand, the superior performance of MNEs’ a¢liates might in fact be
due to the so-called ”composition e¤ect”. As suggested by the internalization the-
ory of FDI, MNEs tend to be concentrated in high R&D and advertising spending
sectors where multinationals are more likely to possess proprietary assets that can
be transferred to local subsidiaries. As foreign a¢liates might be more productive
4simply because they operate in higher productivity sectors, their relative perfor-
mance must be assessed controlling for industry di¤erences. For instance, Davies
and Lyons (1991) report that half of the 40% superior productivity of MNEs located
in the UK compared with local …rms is simply due to this composition e¤ect, MNEs
being concentrated in high value added per employee industries.
On the other hand, recent theoretical models developed in the Industrial Or-
ganization literature have shown how heterogeneity (in terms of age, size, capital
intensity, input and managerial quality, and the like) a¤ects …rms’ productivity.1
Therefore, the higher productivity of MNEs’ subsidiaries might be simply due to
their di¤erent characteristics. Following this argument some authors have assessed
the relative performance of foreign a¢liates controlling for observable characteris-
tics. Globerman et al. (1994), analyse a cross section of Canadian establishments
and …nd that those owned by MNEs show a higher value per employee than do-
mestic ones even controlling for industry e¤ects. However, once the authors control
for capital intensity, size and workforce composition MNEs’ superior performance
disappears. A di¤erent result is found by Doms and Jensen (1998). By analysing a
large cross section of US establishments they show that MNEs’ subsidiaries have 2.3
to 3.7% higher total factor productivity than domestically owned establishments,
even after controlling for observable characteristics such as industry, size, age and
state. Quite interestingly, they also …nd that foreign-owned establishments are less -
and not more - productive than the subset of domestic-owned establishments owned
by US …rms with overseas assets.
Finally, a more recent stream of literature has questioned the superior perfor-
mance of MNE’s a¢liates on methodological grounds. In fact, some individual
characteristics are clearly unobservable (e.g. managerial quality) and hence they
cannot be controlled for in cross section data. Furthermore, performance measures
1For a recent review see for instance De Backer, 2001.
5such as total factor productivity (TFP) are obtained through estimation of pro-
duction functions where problems of simultaneity and measurements errors usually
occur. In fact, productivity shocks might be known by managers (but not by the
econometrician) so that inputs are adjusted accordingly. In addition to this, input
factors, especially capital, are prone to measurement error. As it is well known,
these features make ordinary least squares estimates biased and inconsistent.
To deal with some of the aforementioned methodological issues, recent work
has estimated augmented production functions by using appropriate panel data
techniques. The results of this scarce literature are mixed. Gri¢th (1999a, 1999b)
applies the same econometric estimation technique used in this paper and tests
whether foreign-owned UK plants in the car industry have higher levels of TFP
than domestic-owned plants. She …nds that - despite the fact that foreign-owned
establishments have higher output and value-added per worker - these di¤erences
are largely explained by di¤erent levels of factor usage and labor quality, so that
di¤erences in TFP between foreign and domestic-owned plants are very low and
statistically insigni…cant. A rather di¤erent conclusion is reached by Girma et al.
(2001) who apply random e¤ect techniques to a cross-industry panel of UK …rms.
They report that foreign a¢liates display higher TFP levels, and signi…cantly so,
than domestic …rms. Quite interestingly, after splitting by country of origin, US
…rms are found to be the most productive …rms in the sample, whereas Japanese
companies are not statistically di¤erent from domestic-owned …rms.
Mixed results are also provided by those studies focussing directly on the impact
of foreign acquisitions. Conyon et al. (2002) collect data on UK …rms acquired
by foreign companies before and after the acquisition occurs. Results from …xed-
e¤ect estimates show that …rms acquired by foreign companies experience a 14%
signi…cant increase in labor productivity in the period following the acquisition.
However, their result can be criticised as the performance comparison is based on
6a partial productivity measure, even if the authors control for capital intensity. A
very di¤erent result is found by Harris and Robinson (2002) who analyse a large
cross-industry sample of UK plants observed in the 80s and the 90s. Not only
foreign companies are found to acquire the most productive plants but, after the
acquisition, the performance of these plants is also found to deteriorate.
Summing up, there is overwhelming empirical evidence suggesting a positive
statistical association between foreign ownership and productivity. However, more
recent work, where endogeneity problems are controlled for, casts more than a
passing doubt on whether this association can be given a causal or structural inter-
pretation. In this paper we contribute to this strand of research by providing novel
empirical evidence based on a large panel of manufacturing …rms located in Italy.
The way we control for endogeneity issues is described in the next section.
3T h e M o d e l







it i =1 ;2;:::;N; t =1 ;2;:::T (1)
where Yit, Mit, Lit, Kit denote respectively production, consumption of materials
and services, employment and capital stock of …rm i at time t. The productivity
term Ait is modelled as follows:
Ait = e°Oit+±t+´i+uit (2)
uit = vit +sit (3)
vit = ½vit¡1 +eit j½j < 1 (4)
eit;s it » MA(0)
7where Oit is a neutral shift variable capturing the type of ownership (domestic
or foreign) which potentially can vary both over time and across …rms, ±t is a
time speci…c intercept, ´i is the individual e¤ect which in the present context can
be thought of as unobserved …rm characteristics - such as managerial quality and
structure - that can be viewed as constant over the sample period, and uit is the
idiosyncratic error. In turn uit is made by a …rst order autoregressive productivity
shock, vit and by a serially uncorrelated measurement error, sit. By using equations
(2), (3) and (4) and by taking logs, equation (1) can be rewritten in the following
dynamic representation:
yit = ½yit¡1 + ¯mmit ¡ ½¯mmit¡1 +¯llit ¡½¯llit¡1 + (5)










wit = eit + sit ¡½sit¡1
where yit, mit, lit,a n dkit are the logarithms of Yit, Mit, Lit, Kit respectively.
Finally, equation (5) is equivalent to:
yit = ¼1yit¡1 +¼2mit + ¼3mit¡1 +¼4lit + ¼5lit¡1 + (6)




subject to four non-linear restrictions ¼1¼2 = ¡¼3, ¼1¼4 = ¡¼5, ¼1¼6 = ¡¼7,a n d
¼1¼8 = ¡¼9.
As stated in the previous section the main purpose of this paper is to recover
consistent estimates of the expected e¤ect on productivity of a change in the type of
8ownership, holding all other variables …xed. To achieve this goal, reasonable iden-
ti…cation assumptions have to be made. In particular, it seems sensible to assume
that both input factors (mit;l it;k it) and type of ownership (Oit) are correlated with
the individual e¤ect (´¤
i) as well as with past and present idiosyncratic error terms
(wit). In particular, this allows for the possibility that …rm heterogeneity and id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks - if observable to potential investors even if not to
the econometrician - matter in attracting foreign investors.
As shown in Arellano and Bond (1991), the following assumptions on the initial
conditions:
E(xi1eit)=E(xi1sit)=0 for t =2 ;:::;T
where xit =( mit;l it;k it;y it;O it)
yield 5 £ 0:5(T ¡ 2)(T ¡ 3) moment conditions:
E(xit¡s¢wit)=0for t =4 ;:::;T and 3 · s · t ¡1 (7)
In turn this allows the exploitation of t ¡ 3 and earlier levels of the variables as
instruments once equation (6) has been …rst-di¤erenced to eliminate the individual
e¤ect, ´¤
i.2 Unfortunately the resulting …rst-di¤erenced GMM estimator has been
shown to have poor …nite sample properties when the lagged levels of the series are
only weekly correlated with subsequent …rst di¤erences (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
Furthermore, this has been found to be the case in the context of Cobb-Douglas
production functions where the marginal processes for input factors are typically
highly persistent.3 Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that in this case dramatic
2Note that if variables are measured without error, the number of moment conditions increases
to 5 £ 0:5(T ¡ 1)(T ¡ 2) and variables lagged t ¡ 2 are valid instruments.
3On this issue see Blundell and Bond (2000) and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000).
9reductions in …nite sample biases can be gained if one is willing to assume that:
E(¢nit´¤
i)=0for n = m;l;k;O and t =2 ;:::;T
and E(¢yi2´¤
i)=0
Under these restrictions 5£(T ¡3) additional moment conditions are available:
E[¢xit¡2(´¤
i +wit) ]=0 for t =4 ;:::;T (8)
This allows the use of twice lagged …rst di¤erences of the variables as instruments
for the equation in level. Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest to exploit both sets of
moment conditions in (7) and in (8) as a linear GMM estimator labelled as the
system GMM estimator. The result is a system of 5 £ 0:5(T ¡ 2)(T ¡ 3) …rst
di¤erenced equations and 5 £ (T ¡ 3) level equations.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical work exploits the ”Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano-Reprint database”
(CLA-Reprint database henceforth) which provides information on foreign owner-
ship as well as balance sheet data for a large sample of …rms located in Italy.4
In particular, the CLA-Reprint database reports information on foreign owner-
ship and - when available - balance sheet data for all manufacturing …rms located
in Italy and owned by a foreign company for at least one year in the 1992-99 period.
As some of the …rms are not foreign-owned for the whole period they are observed,
foreign ownership is identi…ed through a …rm-year dummy variable which is equal
to one if the …rm is foreign-owned at the end of the year and zero otherwise. The
4Additional information on the database can be found in the enclosed data appendix.
10database also includes balance sheet data for a random sample of domestic-owned
manufacturing …rms observed in the same period.
For the purpose of the present paper, additional cleaning procedures have been
followed. Firstly, we removed from the original sample …rms with unknown industry
activity, as de…ned by the Nace three digit classi…cation. Secondly, we excluded
observations with either missing or non-positive values for output, materials, and
capital stock. We required a more stringent condition for employment and chose
to keep only observations with more than 10 employees. The rationale here is that
accounting information for very small …rms are unlikely to be very reliable. Thirdly,
we applied a standard trimming procedure to the logarithmic …rst di¤erences of all
the variables used in estimation and we excluded observations with values above 1 or
below -0.5. Finally, given the requirements of the adopted econometric methodology
we selected only …rms with at least four contiguous observations. Our …nal sample
is made of 2,026 …rms with a number of contiguous observations ranging from 4 to
6 for a total of 10,324 observations (see Table 1).
Table 2 and 3 present some features of foreign ownership in our sample. Firstly,
foreign ownership accounts for approximately 39% of observations (see Table 2).
Notice that the same proportion does not apply to …rms as some of them change
ownership either from domestic to foreign or viceversa over the sample period.
Secondly, the CLA-Reprint database also reports foreign owners’ country of origin
and the starting date of foreign ownership. These are two important pieces of
information which can be exploited to shed additional light on the topic studied in
this paper. On the one hand, it can be assumed that MNEs’ country of origin may
matter for their ability to possess or transfer proprietary assets to their a¢liates.
For instance, Japanese …rms are commonly viewed as having markedly di¤erent
work practices and logistical systems (such as ”just-in-time” inventory planning).
For this reason, we identi…ed the countries with larger shares of foreign ownership
11(in decreasing order, USA, Germany, France, and United Kingdom, see Table 2) and
allocated the remaining countries into two groups: other EU countries and other
non-EU countries (including Japan). The result is a set of six dummy variables,
one for each of these (groups of) countries. On the other hand, it is reasonable to
assume that the transfer of proprietary assets is not an instantaneous and once-for-
all phenomenon. Hence, a progressive performance improvement should be recorded
as long as the number of years under foreign ownership increases. Therefore, we
constructed an additional …rm-year dummy variable which takes the value of one
if foreign ownership starts no more than …ve years before the observation year and
zero otherwise. We label the observations for which this variable is strictly positive
as ”new” foreign …rms and the remaining observations as ”old” foreign …rms. As
shown in Table 2, 24% of foreign observations are ”new”. If the transfer of the
proprietary assets occurs and a¤ects …rms’ performance, then ”new” foreign …rms
should display a lower productivity level than ”old” ones. On the contrary, the lack
of any systematic di¤erence between the two sets of observations provides indirect
support to the hypothesis that foreign ownership ”per se” does not a¤ect …rms’
productivity.
Inspection of Table 3, which shows the distribution of our sample among the
23 Nace two-digit sectors, reveals - in accordance with the internalisation theory
of FDI - that foreign ownership is concentrated in ”high tech” industries. In fact,
the share of observations in high tech industries is much higher for foreign than for
domestic ownership (56.54% vs. 27.08%). Compared with domestic ownership, for-
eign ownership is especially concentrated in chemicals (21.54% vs. 4.94%), medical
equipment and measurement instruments (4.70% vs. 1.26%) and - to a lesser extent
- in electrical machinery (7.48% vs. 3.87%) and motor vehicles (4.03% vs. 2.11%).
Finally, Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
econometric analysis, separately for domestic and foreign ownership. As unani-
12mously found in the literature, foreign …rms appear to be much larger (from four
to …ve times) than domestic ones in terms of both output and inputs. As for labor
productivity (measured as real output per worker), foreign …rms do outperform do-
mestic ones both if one considers the mean (0.528 vs. 0.454) and the median (0.395
vs. 0.317). However, MNEs’ subsidiaries appear to compensate, at least partially,
the more productive use of labor with a more intensive use of other inputs. Both
capital and material intensities are in fact higher for foreign …rms.
Summing up, our summary statistics con…rm some ”stylised facts” on MNEs’
foreign a¢liates. They are larger than domestic …rms, they are concentrated in
”high-tech” sectors and they display a higher labor productivity than domestic
…rms. However, MNEs’ subsidiaries are more capital intensive than local …rms.
The latter consideration suggests that the use of a partial productivity measure
could be misleading and supports the use of a total productivity measure. This is
performed in our analysis based on production function estimates, whose results are
presented in the next section.
5R e s u l t s
Results from the estimation of the unrestricted version of the dynamic Cobb-
Douglas production function in equation (6) are shown in Tables 5 to 10. In each
table four sets of estimates are reported. With the exception of Table 7, columns
di¤er either for the choice of instruments (columns 1 and 2 versus columns 3 and
4) or for the inclusion/exclusion of the ownership variable lagged once as regressor
(columns 1 and 3 versus columns 2 and 4).5 In Table 7 instead, columns di¤er for
the exclusion/inclusion of industry dummies (columns 1 and 2 versus columns 3 and
4) or for the inclusion/exclusion of the once lagged ownership variable (columns 1
5See the legend to Tables 5 to 10 for more detailed information on the set of intruments for
each equation.
13and 3 versus columns 2 and 4).6 For each equation estimated coe¢cients are re-
ported together with their corresponding p-values testing the hypothesis that each
coe¢cient is equal to zero. In addition to estimated coe¢cients, implied factor
("my;" ly;" ky) and scale elasticities are also shown. We also report the results of
…rst and second-order residual serial correlation tests (m1 and m2 denote the p-
values of the relevant test statistic) and, whenever appropriate, the Sargan tests
of over-identifying restrictions. Finally, the long run partial e¤ects of the type of
ownership (domestic versus foreign) on productivity are reported, together with the
corresponding p-values testing the non-linear restrictions (via the delta method)
that the computed coe¢cient is equal to zero.
Table 5 shows the results for the basic model using earlier instruments dated t¡3
for the equations in …rst di¤erences and instruments dated t ¡ 2 for the equations
in level. This choice of instruments is consistent with the orthogonality conditions
stated in (7) and (8) respectively. In all columns the test statistics indicate that
there is evidence of …rst but not of second order serial correlation. However, as can
be seen by looking at columns 1 and 2, the Sargan statistics reject the validity of
the complete set of instruments at the 5 per cent signi…cance level (but not at the
one per cent). Once O(3;5) and ¢Ot¡2 are removed from the set of instruments
the situation improves and the validity of this reduced set of instruments cannot
be rejected even at the 5 per cent signi…cance level (see column 3). In all columns,
punctual estimates of factor elasticities look reasonable, perhaps with the exception
of the output to capital elasticity which is a little bit on the low side.7 Furthermore,
punctual estimates of scale elasticity point out to the presence of modest increasing
returns to scale. More importantly for the purpose of the present paper, the long
6Given the very high persistency of the ownership variable, the comparison between the results
with and without the lagged ownership dummy provides a consistency check that our …ndings are
not badly a¤ected by near multicollinearity problems.
7We also experimented with alternative de…nitions of the capital stock, including the original
accounting variable. All our crucial results are insensitive to the use of these alternative measures.
14run (LR) ownership e¤ect is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero in all speci…cations.
In turn this implies that once controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity
and measurement errors, we do not observe in the aggregate any ”structural” e¤ect
of foreign ownership on productivity.
As a mean of comparison, Tables 6 and 7 report the results we obtain when
applying alternative estimation methods. In particular, Table 6 shows the results
using earlier instruments dated t¡2 for the equations in …rst di¤erences and instru-
ments dated t ¡ 1 for the equations in level. This choice of instruments is valid if
wit » MA(0). This obviously contradicts the assumptions made on the composite
idiosyncratic error term in (5) unless the presence of measurement errors is ruled
out. In all columns of Table 6 the validity of the choice of instruments is strongly
rejected by the Sargan test of overidenty…ng restrictions. In turn, this result clearly
points out to the presence of measurement errors. In Table 7, OLS estimates are
reported. As it is well known, the validity of this estimation method relies on the
assumption that each component of the error term - including the time invariant
individual e¤ect - is uncorrelated with all regressors in (5), clearly a very unlikely
event in the present context. However, these estimates can still be informative
to the extent they allow us to measure the statistical associations (as opposed to
”structural” or ”causal” relations) - unconditional to the unobservables - among our
variables of interest. With this purpose in mind, in columns 1 and 2 the model is
estimated without industry dummies which are instead included in columns 3 and
4. All equations show a positive and in most cases signi…cant relation between the
type of ownership dummy and productivity. Furthermore, this statistical associa-
tion turns out to be larger (3.9-4.6% versus 1.6-2.6%) and more signi…cant when
industry dummies are not included, that is when the so-called composition e¤ect is
not controlled for (see Davies and Lyons, 1991).
Tables 8 to 10 present additional evidence by allowing the coe¢cients on the
15ownership variable to di¤er according to economically meaningful criteria.8 Ac-
cording to received theory it is in high-tech industries that multinationals are more
likely to possess proprietary assets that can be transferred to local subsidiaries.
This prediction is tested in Table 8 where the e¤ect of ownership on productivity is
estimated separately for foreign …rms located in high-tech (HT) as opposed to low-
tech (LT) industries. Also, as already mentioned in the previous section, it might
be argued that it takes some years for MNEs’ proprietary assets to be transferred to
foreign subsidiaries and, possibly more importantly, to be used e¢ciently. For this
reason Table 9 allows the relevant coe¢cients to vary according to whether …rms
are under foreign ownership by more (OLD) or less-equal than …ve years (NEW).
Finally, it has also to be taken into account that countries di¤er with respect to
many economic aspects, including their distance from the technological frontier. To
test whether this makes any di¤erence on the observed structural relation between
ownership and productivity, Table 10 presents the results of our estimates which
compare subsidiaries of US companies (US) with subsidiaries of companies located
in other foreign countries (OT).
These additional empirical results can be summarized as follow. Firstly, punc-
tual estimates suggest that foreign ownership has a positive e¤ect on productivity
in high-tech industries and a negative e¤ect in low-tech-industries. However, as can
be seen by looking at all columns in Table 8, coe¢cients are imprecisely estimated.
Not only they are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at any conventional statisti-
cal level, but their di¤erence is also not statistically signi…cant. Similar conclusions
can be drawn by looking at Table 9. In all speci…cations the coe¢cients on both
”old” and ”new” foreign …rms are negative but insigni…cant. Finally, and rather
interestingly, in three out of four equations, we …nd that US foreign …rms tend to
be signi…cantly more productive than domestic …rms. Moreover, the di¤erence be-
8In all equations earlier instruments are dated t-3 for the equations in …rst di¤erences and t-2
for the equations in level.
16tween US …rms and OT …rms is signi…cant in all models at the 10 per cent and in
three out of four model at the 5 per cent signi…cance level.9
6 Conclusions
Both received theory on multinational …rms and common wisdom point out that
subsidiaries of foreign …rms should operate more e¢ciently than local …rms. How-
ever, this may occur for di¤erent reasons. Indeed, it may be explained by the
fact the MNEs possess superior managerial and/or technological skills that can be
transferred to their foreign a¢liates. However, it might also be the outcome of a
preference for MNEs to acquire the best locals or to operate in the most productive
industries. Finally, as pointed out by Gri¢th (1999a, 1999b) it may simply be that
both groups of …rms are drawn from the same distribution but only the best foreign
o w n e d… r m sh a v ec h o s e nt ol o c a t ei nag i v e nc o u n t r y .
To shed some light on this issue we have tried to recover the ”structural” or
”causal” e¤ect of foreign ownership on productivity by imposing only relatively
mild restrictions on the initial conditions for the variables in our dynamic model.
In particular we have applied the GMM-System estimator developed by Blundell
and Bond (1998) which has allowed us to control for unobserved heterogeneity,
simultaneity and measurement errors.
The descriptiveevidence presentedinthispapersuggests thattheaverage foreign
…rm is larger and more (labor) productive than the average domestic counterpart.
Furthermore, it is more likely to operate in high-tech industries. Obviously, these
statistical associations do not necessarily imply a ”causal” relation. Indeed our
econometric results suggest that in the aggregate there is no ”structural” relation
9We run additional equations by splitting the OT …rms according the following list of countries:
Germany, France, UK, Other EU Countries, Other non-EU Countries. We …nd zero e¤ects for all
countries but ”Other non-EU Countries” where a negative and signi…cant e¤ect is detected. These
additional results are available from the authors upon request.
17at all. In plain words, this implies that the expected e¤ect on total factor produc-
tivity of a change from domestic to foreign ownership (regardless of nationality)
is zero. This …nding holds even after allowing the ”structural” e¤ect to di¤er be-
tween high-tech and low-tech industries or between ”old” and ”new” foreign …rms.
However our results are not completely negative since we also …nd that nationality
matters. Rather interestingly, a positive and signi…cant e¤ect is found for …rms
under US ownership but not for …rms under EU ownership. This in turn opens a
policy relevant question on whether our results have to be interpreted as evidence
of American multinationals being more skilled or better equipped to transfer their
skills e¢ciently than their European counterparts.
187 References
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1991): ”Some tests of speci…cation for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations”, Review of Economic
Studies, 58, 277-297.
Arellano, M. and Bond, S. (1998): ”Dynamic panel data estimation using
DPD98 for gauss: a guide for users”, December, mimeo.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998): ”Initial conditions and moment restrictions
in dynamic panel data models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143.
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (2000) ”Gmm estimation with persistent panel data:
an application to production functions”, Econometric Reviews, 19(3), 321-340.
Blundell, R., Bond, S. and Windmeijer, F. (2000): ”Estimation in dynamic
panel data models: improving the performance of the standard GMM estimators”,
Advances in econometrics, 15, 53-91.
Caves, R. (1996): ”Multinational enterprise and economic analysis”, second
edition, Cambridge University Press.
Conyon, M., Girma, S., Thompson, S. and Wright, P. (2002): ”The productivity
and wage e¤ect of foreign acquisition in the United Kingdom”, Journal of Industrial
Economics, L(1), 85-102.
Davies, S. and Lyons, B. (1991) ”Characterising the relative performance: the
productivity advantage of foreign owned …rms in the UK”, Oxford Economic Papers,
43, 584-595.
De Backer, K. (2001): ”Why are foreign …rms more productive than domestic
…rms?”, Departement toegepaste economische wetenschappen, Katholieke Univer-
siteit Leuven, Research Report, 0143.
Doms, M. E. and Jensen, J. B. (1998) ”Comparing wages, skills, and produc-
tivity between domestic and foreign owned manufacturing establishments in the
United States”, in Baldwin, R., Lipsey, R. and Richardson, J. (eds) ”Geography
19and ownership as bases for economic accounting”, University of Chicago Press.
Girma, S., Greenaway, D. and Wakelin, K. (2001): ”Who bene…ts from foreign
domestic investment in the UK”, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 48(2), 119-
133.
Globerman S., Ries, J. and Vertinsky, I. (1994) ”The economic performance of
foreign a¢liates in Canada”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 27, 143-156.
Gri¢th R. (1999a): ”Productivity and foreign ownership in the UK car indus-
try”, IFS working paper 99/11.
Gri¢th R. (1999b): ”Using the ARD establishment data to looking at foreign
ownership and productivity in the United Kingdom ”, Economic Journal, 109, 416-
442.
Harris, R. and Robinson, C. (2002): ”The impact of foreign acquisitions on
total factor productivity: plant level evidence from UK manufacturing, 1987-1992”,
Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
208 Data Appendix
8.1 The Sample
The data used in this paper come from the CLA-Reprint database. It has been
constructed by Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano in collaboration with R&P consulting
company and the Department of Economics and Production of the Politechnic of
Milan. The database provides two kinds of information: i) information on foreign
ownership for all manufacturing …rms located in Italy and owned by a foreign com-
pany for at least one year in the 1992-99 period; ii) balance sheet data covering the
same period for a large sample of (both foreign and domestic-owned) …rms located
in Italy.
The following information on foreign-owned manufacturing …rms is available in
the database: identi…cation number (”Partita IVA”), name, localisation and main
industry of activity (NACE-Rev.1, …ve digit classi…cation) of the foreign owned
company; name and country of origin of the foreign owner; starting date (and
ending date, if any) of foreign participation; type of foreign participation (majority,
joint, minority).
The CLA-Reprint database also contains balance sheet data for 1,600 foreign-
owned …rms as well as for a random sample of domestic-owned …rms. Balance sheet
data have been retrieved from the on-line version of the Aida data-bank produced
by Bureau Van Dijk. The on-line version includes data for the 6 most recent …scal
years and provides information for more than 50,000 Italian manufacturing …rms.
The sample of domestic-owned …rms (4,846 …rms) has been selected by drawing
a random sample of 5,000 …rms and by excluding foreign …rms from the random
sample.
For the purpose of the present paper, additional cleaning procedures have been
followed. Firstly, we removed from the original sample …rms with unknown industry
21activity, as de…ned by the Nace three digit classi…cation. This has been done in
order to allow the use of three-digit price de‡ators for output. Secondly, we excluded
observations with either missing or non-positive values for output, materials, and
capital stock. We required a more stringent condition for employment and chose
to keep only observations with more than 10 employees. The rationale here is that
accounting information for very small …rms are unlikely to be very reliable. Indeed,
observations for the micro-…rms in the original sample show puzzling summary
statistics for some of the variables (and especially for the capital stock). Thirdly,
we applied a standard trimming procedure to the logarithmic …rst di¤erences of all
the variables used in estimation and we excluded observations with values above 1
or below -0.5. In this case the purpose is to exclude form the sample …rms with
anomalously high growth rates in absolute values. Finally, given the requirements
of the adopted econometric methodology we selected only …rms with at least four
contiguous observations. Our …nal sample is made of 2,026 …rms with a number of
contiguous observations ranging from 4 to 6 for a total of 10,324 observations (see
Table 1).
8.2 The Variables
The variables used in the estimation of the production function are output, mate-
rials, capital stock and labor.
Output is computed as the sum of sales, capitalised costs and the change of work-
in-progress and in …nished goods inventories. All variables are de‡ated with the
appropriate three digit production price index provided by the National Statistical
Bureau (ISTAT).
Materials are computed as a Tornquist index of de‡ated materials and services.
Materials equal purchases of materials net of theincrease in raw materialinventories.
Materials are de‡ated with an aggregate price index for raw materials and services
22a r ed e ‡ a t e dw i t ht h eG D Pp r i c ei n d e x .
The capital stock is the real …xed capital stock (at the end of period) computed
by a Perpetual Inventory Method with a constant rate of depreciation (6%). The
benchmark at the …rst year is the accounting value as reported in the balance
sheet; …xed investment is the di¤erence between the capital stock as reported in
two contiguous balance sheets and the de‡ator is the production price index for
investment goods.
Labor is measured as the total number of workers at the end of the …scal year.
23Table 1: Number of Consecutive Observations





Table 2: Share of Observations by Type of Ownership (%)
Sector Observations
Domestic Ownership (DO) 60:62




Other EU Countries 6:31
United States 9:00
Other non-EU Countries 6:62
New FO Firms 9:33
Old FO Firms 30:05
Note: New (Old) FO …rms refer to …rm-year observations fallen under foreign owner-
ship no more (more) than 5 years before.
24Table 3: Share of Observations by Industry (%)
Industry Dom. Owner. For Owner.




Leather and Leather Goods 5:13 0:42
Wood Products 2:56 0:12
Paper and Paper Products 2:27 3:32
Printing and Publishing 2:32 2:43
Coke and Petroleum Products 0:75 1:03
Chemical Products(*) 4:94 21:54
Rubber and Plastics 6:73 8:04
Non-Ferrous Production 7:94 5:63
Ferrous Production 2:84 2:61
Ferrous Products (exc. Machinery) 12:08 6:76
Machinery Products(*) 12:62 15:54
O¢ce Machinery and Computers(*) 0:27 0:15
Electrical Machinery(*) 3:87 7:48
Radio, TV and TLC Equipments(*) 1:05 2:14
M e d i c a lE q u i p m e n t ,M e a s .I n s t r u m . ( * ) 1:26 4:70
Motor Vehicles(*) 2:11 4:03
Other Transportation Equipments(*) 0:96 0:96
Other Manufacturing Industries 7:85 2:19
Recycling 0:00 0:12
Total 100:00 100:00
High-Tech Industries (HT) 27:08 56:54
Note: * denotes high-tech industries.
25Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean St. Dv. 1st Q. Median 3rd Q.
Dom. Owners.
Output (Y ) 34:20 143:96 8:16 13:66 27:72
Materials (M) 17:29 102:35 3:24 5:93 12:59
Labor (L) 86:50 348:13 25:00 40:00 79:00
Capital (K) 5:96 18:72 0:91 2:21 5:03
Output/Labor (Y=L) 0:454 0:684 0:219 0:317 0:517
Capital/Labor (K=L) 0:073 0:088 0:026 0:050 0:090
Materials/Labor (M=L) 0:239 0:548 0:080 0:137 0:256
For. Owners.
Output (Y ) 174:72 656:25 26:30 57:27 134:44
Materials (M) 80:74 290:89 11:33 25:62 60:15
Labor (L) 373:68 956:28 63:00 141:00 325:00
Capital (K) 29:76 89:16 3:23 8:86 22:26
Output/Labor (Y=L) 0:528 0:600 0:269 0:395 0:596
Capital/Labor (K=L) 0:087 0:123 0:033 0:058 0:103
Materials/Labor (M=L) 0:272 0:410 0:105 0:171 0:300
Note: all variables except Labor are in billions lira at 1995 prices. Labor is measured
as number of employees at the end of …scal year.
26Table 5: Equation Results - Basic Model
Estimation method Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys
Earlier Instruments t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2 t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2
yt¡1 0:577(0:00) 0:576(0:00) 0:597(0:00) 0:599(0:00)
mt 0:516(0:00) 0:513(0:00) 0:494(0:00) 0:489(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:231(0:00) ¡0:227(0:00) ¡0:222(0:00) ¡0:219(0:00)
lt 0:481(0:00) 0:488(0:00) 0:430(0:00) 0:438(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:343(0:00) ¡0:348(0:00) ¡0:280(0:00) ¡0:287(0:00)
kt 0:089(0:08) 0:085(0:09) 0:102(0:09) 0:093(0:10)
kt¡1 ¡0:075(0:14) ¡0:072(0:15) ¡0:099(0:09) ¡0:092(0:11)
Ot ¡0:054(0:55) ¡0:002(0:93) ¡0:106(0:45) ¡0:024(0:51)
Ot¡1 0:050(0:57) 0:082(0:54)
²my 0:675 0:673 0:676 0:672
²ly 0:326 0:329 0:372 0:377
²ky 0:032 0:029 0:007 0:002
Scale elasticity 1:033 1:031 1:055 1:052
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:14) (0:12) (0:18) (0:14)
Sargan (0:04) (0:04) (0:06) (0:06)
LR ownership e¤ect ¡0:008(0:90) ¡0:005(0:93) ¡0:062(0:51) ¡0:061(0:52)
Note: All regressions are estimated in DPD98 (see Arellano and Bond, 1998). All
estimates include a full set of time and two-digit industry dummies as regressors and
instruments. In all columns instruments used are l(3,5), m(3,5), k(3,5), y(3,5) for the
equations in di¤erences and ¢l(t-2), ¢m(t-2), ¢k(t-2), ¢y(t-2) for the equations in level.
Additional instruments in columns (i) and (ii) are O(3,5) and ¢O(t-2). P-values in round
brackets. The null hypothesis that each coe¢cient is equal to zero is tested using one-step
robust standard errors. m1(m2) is a test of the null hypothesis of no …rst (second) order
serial correlation. Sargan is a test of the validity of the overidenty…ng restrictions based
on the e¢cient two-step GMM estimator.
27Table 6: Equation Results - Alternative Estimation Method
(Gmm-Sys 2)
Estimation method Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys
Earlier Instruments t ¡ 2;¢t ¡1 t ¡2;¢t ¡ 1 t ¡2;¢t ¡ 1 t ¡ 2;¢t ¡1
yt¡1 0:401(0:00) 0:402(0:00) 0:423(0:00) 0:421(0:00)
mt 0:481(0:00) 0:480(0:00) 0:444(0:00) 0:446(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:011(0:70) ¡0:011(0:69) 0:007(0:80) 0:008(0:80)
lt 0:255(0:00) 0:254(0:00) 0:219(0:00) 0:220(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:136(0:03) ¡0:135(0:03) ¡0:110(0:12) ¡0:111(0:12)
kt 0:072(0:04) 0:071(0:04) 0:109(0:01) 0:109(0:01)
kt¡1 ¡0:065(0:07) ¡0:065(0:07) ¡0:108(0:01) ¡0:109(0:01)
Ot 0:021(0:78) 0:001(0:97) -0:013(0:91) 0:031(0:37)
Ot¡1 ¡0:020(0:78) 0:045(0:70)
²my 0:786 0:786 0:782 0:783
²ly 0:198 0:198 0:190 0:189
²ky 0:011 0:011 0:000 0:000
Scale elasticity 0:994 0:995 0:973 0:972
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:25) (0:25) (0:55) (0:53)
Sargan (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
LR ownership e¤ect 0:002(0:97) 0:001(0:97) 0:055(0:37) 0:054(0:38)
Note: All regressions are estimated in DPD98 (see Arellano and Bond, 1998). All
estimates include a full set of time and two-digit industry dummies as regressors and
instruments. In all columns instruments used are l(2,5), m(2,5), k(2,5), y(2,5) for the
equations in di¤erences and ¢l(t-1), ¢m(t-1), ¢k(t-1), ¢y(t-1) for the equations in level.
Additional instruments in columns (i) and (ii) are O(2,5) and ¢O(t-1). P-values in round
brackets. The null hypothesis that each coe¢cient is equal to zero is tested using one-step
robust standard errors. m1(m2) is a test of the null hypothesis of no …rst (second) order
serial correlation. Sargan is a test of the validity of the overidenty…ng restrictions based
on the e¢cient two-step GMM estimator.
28Table 7: Equation Results - Alternative Estimation Method (Ols)
Estimation method Ols Ols Ols Ols
yt¡1 0:848(0:00) 0:848(0:00) 0:836(0:00) 0:836(0:00)
mt 0:509(0:00) 0:509(0:00) 0:510(0:00) 0:510(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:398(0:00) ¡0:398(0:00) ¡0:390(0:00) ¡0:390(0:00)
lt 0:266(0:00) 0:266(0:00) 0:265(0:00) 0:265(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:227(0:00) ¡0:227(0:00) ¡0:223(0:00) ¡0:223(0:00)
kt 0:019(0:00) 0:019(0:00) 0:019(0:00) 0:019(0:00)
kt¡1 ¡0:014(0:01) ¡0:014(0:01) ¡0:015(0:00) ¡0:015(0:00)
Ot ¡0:021(0:09) 0:006(0:02) ¡0:023(0:07) 0:003(0:22)
Ot¡1 0:028(0:02) 0:027(0:03)
²my 0:733 0:734 0:731 0:731
²ly 0:253 0:254 0:258 0:260
²ky 0:030 0:029 0:023 0:023
Scale elasticity 1:016 1:017 1:013 1:014
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:01)
Sargan
LR ownership e¤ect 0:046(0:00) 0:039(0:01) 0:026(0:09) 0:019(0:21)
Note: All regressions are estimated in DPD98 (see Arellano and Bond, 1998). All
estimates include a full set of time dummies. The last two columns also include a full set
of two-digit industry dummies as regressors. The null hypothesis that each coe¢cient is
equal to zero is tested using one-step robust standard errors. m1(m2)i sat e s to ft h en u l l
hypothesis of no …rst (second) order serial correlation.
29Table 8: Equation Results - ”High-Tech” versus ”Low Tech” FO Firms
Estimation method Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys
Number of Observations t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2
yt¡1 0:570(0:00) 0:575(0:00) 0:580(0:00) 0:596(0:00)
mt 0:516(0:00) 0:511(0:00) 0:490(0:00) 0:467(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:233(0:00) ¡0:225(0:00) ¡0:218(0:00) ¡0:200(0:00)
lt 0:483(0:00) 0:490(0:00) 0:442(0:00) 0:456(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:336(0:00) ¡0:351(0:00) ¡0:275(0:01) ¡0:302(0:00)
kt 0:099(0:07) 0:085(0:09) 0:112(0:08) 0:096(0:10)
kt¡1 ¡0:088(0:10) ¡0:072(0:16) ¡0:108(0:08) ¡0:092(0:11)
Ot ¤ HTt ¡0:396(0:09) 0:006(0:93) ¡0:568(0:07) 0:037(0:66)
Ot¡1 ¤ HTt¡1 0:438(0:07) 0:646(0:04)
Ot ¤ LTt 0:109(0:46) -0:006(0:88) 0:047(0:82) ¡0:076(0:28)
Ot¡1 ¤ LTt¡1 ¡0:124(0:43) ¡0:133(0:50)
²my 0:658 0:672 0:647 0:663
²ly 0:343 0:328 0:397 0:382
²ky 0:025 0:030 0:008 0:009
Scale elasticity 1:026 1:030 1:052 1:054
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:28) (0:12) (0:47) (0:14)
Sargan (0:14) (0:04) (0:29) (0:07)
LR ownership e¤ect
High-Tech (HT) 0:098(0:61) 0:015(0:93) 0:186(0:42) 0:092(0:66)
Low-Tech (LT) ¡0:036(0:73) ¡0:015(0:88) ¡0:204(0:29) ¡0:187(0:30)
High-Low (HT ¡LT) 0:134(0:61) 0:030(0:90) 0:390(0:29) 0:279(0:41)
Note: as in Table 5.
30Table 9: Equation Results - ”Old” versus ”New” FO Firms
Estimation method Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys
Number of Observations t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2
yt¡1 0:568(0:00) 0:578(0:00) 0:576(0:00) 0:592(0:00)
mt 0:512(0:00) 0:509(0:00) 0:504(0:00) 0:502(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:218(0:00) ¡0:225(0:00) ¡0:220(0:00) ¡0:231(0:00)
lt 0:475(0:00) 0:487(0:00) 0:419(0:00) 0:432(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:330(0:00) ¡0:345(0:00) ¡0:259(0:01) ¡0:281(0:00)
kt 0:086(0:09) 0:083(0:10) 0:084(0:17) 0:096(0:10)
kt¡1 ¡0:074(0:15) ¡0:072(0:16) ¡0:075(0:22) ¡0:087(0:13)
Ot ¤ OLDt ¡0:153(0:20) ¡0:011(0:77) ¡0:108(0:50) ¡0:006(0:88)
Ot¡1 ¤ OLDt¡1 0:143(0:19) 0:104(0:48)
Ot ¤ NEWt ¡0:055(0:54) ¡0:003(0:90) ¡0:055(0:73) ¡0:093(0:15)
Ot¡1 ¤ NEWt¡1 0:050(0:56) ¡0:059(0:71)
²my 0:679 0:674 0:671 0:665
²ly 0:335 0:337 0:378 0:372
²ky 0:029 0:027 0:021 0:020
Scale elasticity 1:044 1:037 1:069 1:057
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:09) (0:11) (0:10) (0:23)
Sargan (0:06) (0:04) (0:21) (0:23)
LR ownership e¤ect
OLD ¡0:024(0:79) ¡0:027(0:77) ¡0:009(0:93) ¡0:015(0:88)
NEW ¡0:011(0:85) ¡0:008(0:90) ¡0:268(0:10) ¡0:227(0:16)
OLD-NEW ¡0:013(0:84) ¡0:019(0:78) 0:259(0:13) 0:212(0:19)
Note: as in Table 5.
31Table 10: Equation Results ”US” versus ”Other” FO Firms
Estimation method Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys Gmm-Sys
Number of Observations t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡3;¢t ¡ 2 t ¡ 3;¢t ¡2
yt¡1 0:531(0:00) 0:522(0:00) 0:563(0:00) 0:551(0:00)
mt 0:506(0:00) 0:495(0:00) 0:483(0:00) 0:467(0:00)
mt¡1 ¡0:189(0:01) ¡0:172(0:01) ¡0:187(0:01) ¡0:166(0:02)
lt 0:448(0:00) 0:465(0:00) 0:384(0:00) 0:418(0:00)
lt¡1 ¡0:289(0:00) ¡0:304(0:00) ¡0:217(0:03) ¡0:254(0:01)
kt 0:055(0:31) 0:059(0:26) 0:072(0:24) 0:075(0:20)
kt¡1 ¡0:041(0:44) ¡0:046(0:38) ¡0:068(0:26) ¡0:073(0:22)
Ot ¤ USt 0:290(0:11) 0:158(0:03) 0:366(0:11) 0:144(0:06)
Ot¡1 ¤ USt¡1 ¡0:155(0:42) ¡0:273(0:27)
Ot ¤ OTt ¡0:181(0:12) -0:052(0:12) ¡0:261(0:13) ¡0:056(0:20)
Ot¡1 ¤ OTt¡1 0:129(0:25) 0:197(0:22)
²my 0:676 0:674 0:676 0:672
²ly 0:339 0:336 0:381 0:366
²ky 0:030 0:027 0:008 0:005
Scale elasticity 1:045 1:037 1:065 1:042
m1 (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
m2 (0:12) (0:11) (0:17) (0:14)
Sargan (0:09) (0:04) (0:23) (0:07)
LR ownership e¤ect
US 0:288(0:07) 0:331(0:02) 0:215(0:25) 0:321(0:06)
Other (OT) ¡0:110(0:12) ¡0:109(0:11) ¡0:146(0:16) ¡0:125(0:21)
US¡OT 0:398(0:03) 0:440(0:01) 0:361(0:07) 0:446(0:02)
Note: as in Table 5.
32